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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Tonye Daye Awantaye timely appeals from the district court's order revoking 
probation. On appeal, Mr. Awantaye argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him 
due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the appellate record with 
various transcripts. Additionally, Mr. Awantaye argues that the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence without 
reducing it sua sponte. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Awantaye was charged, by information, with driving under the influence of 
alcohol (hereinafter, DUI), and a felony enhancement. (R., pp.77-78.) Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Mr. Awantaye pleaded guilty to felony DUI. (R., pp.129-130.) 
Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with three years 
fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Awantaye on probation. (R., pp.136-
141.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for probation violation alleging 
that Mr. Awantaye violated the terms of his probation. (R., pp.168-171.) Mr. Awantaye 
admitted to violating the terms of his probation by consuming alcohol, frequenting an 
establishment where alcohol is the primary source of income, consuming marijuana, 
contacting an individual for whom such contact was prohibited by his probation officer, 
and operating a motor vehicle without a license. (R., pp.168-171, 183-184.) The district 
court revoked probation and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.197-188.) Upon review of 
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Mr. Awantaye's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court 
suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Awantaye on probation. (R., pp.204-206.) 
After a second period of probation, the State filed a motion for probation violation 
alleging that Mr. Awantaye violated the terms of his probation. (R., pp.226-228.) 
Mr. Awantaye admitted to violating the terms of his probation by consuming alcohol and 
leaving the State of Idaho without permission from his probation officer. (R., pp.226-
228, 234.) The district court revoked probation and again retained jurisdiction. 
(R., pp.237-238.) Upon review of Mr. Awantaye's second rider, the district court 
suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Awantaye on probation. (R., pp.248-249.) 
After a third period of probation, the State filed a motion and an amended motion 
for bench warrant for probation violation alleging that Mr. Awantaye violated the terms of 
his probation. (R., pp.252-254, 270-273.) After an evidentiary hearing, the district court 
found that Mr. Awantaye willfully violated the terms of his probation by consuming 
alcohol, consuming a synthetic cannabinoid, changing his residence without permission, 
failing to pay fees associated with the costs of supervision, failing to pay for public 
defender services, and consuming opiates. (R., pp.316-323.) The district court revoked 
his probation and executed the underlying sentence. (R., pp.352-353.) Mr. Awantaye 
timely appealed. (R., pp.355-357.) 
On appeal, Mr. Awantaye filed a motion to augment the record with various 
transcripts. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-4.) The State objected in part to Mr. Awantaye's 
request for the transcripts. (Objection in part to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, Objection to Motion 
to Augment), pp.1-5.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order granting 
Mr. Awantaye's request for the evidentiary hearing held on January 16, 2013, but 
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denying Mr. Awantaye's request for transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on 
May 10, 2005, the sentencing hearing held on July 14, 2005, the probation violation 
proceedings held on January 8, 2009, the probation violation hearing held on 
February 13, 2009, the rider review hearing held on July 24, 2009, the probation 
violation hearing held on August 6, 2010, the probation violation hearing held on 
September 8, 2010, and the probation violation hearing held on December 16, 2010. 
(Order, (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Awantaye due process and equal 
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with transcripts necessary for 
review of the issues on appeal? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Awantaye's 
probation? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Awantaye's 
sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Awantaye Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment With Transcripts Necessary For Review Of The 
Issues On Appeal 
A. Introduction 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a "colorable need" 
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant 
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to 
the issues on appeal or if a sufficient substitute for the transcript exists. 
In this case, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Awantaye's request for 
transcripts of the change of plea hearing held on May 10, 2005, the sentencing hearing 
held on July 14, 2005, the probation violation proceedings held on January 8, 2009, the 
probation violation hearing held on February 13, 2009, the rider review hearing held on 
July 24, 2009, the probation violation hearing held on August 6, 2010, and the probation 
violation hearing held on September 8, 2010. 1 (Order Denying Motion to Augment), 
pp.1-2.) On appeal, Mr. Awantaye is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of 
his request for these transcripts. Mr. Awantaye asserts that the requested transcripts 
are relevant to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion when it failed 
to reduce his sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation because the applicable 
1 Mr. Awantaye is not challenging the denial of the transcript of the probation violation 
hearing held on December 16, 2010, because Judge Carey presided over that hearing 
and Judge Wetherell was the judge that ultimately executed Mr. Awantaye's sentence. 
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standard of review requires an appellate court to conduct an independent review of the 
entirety of the proceedings in order to evaluate the district court's sentencing decisions. 
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his request. 
B. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Awantaye With Access To 
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And Equal Protection 
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merits-Based Appellate Review Of His Sentencing 
Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAH0 CONST. art. 
I§ 13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Sec. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States 
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of 
Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is statutory. See I .C. § 19-2801. 
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a relevant transcript, the 
transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho 
court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the production of 
transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a). Further, 
"[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .... " Id. 
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Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be 
prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as 
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of an Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) 
motion is an appeal as of right as defined by Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (c)(9). See 
State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (holding an order denying a motion for 
reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is an appealable order pursuant to then I.AR. 
11 (c)(6)). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions directly 
addressing whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases. 
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection 
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants 
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the 
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do 
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet 
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must 
provide indigent defendants with appellate records unless some or all of the requested 
materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
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The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time, 
the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase 
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme 
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty 
defendants was a denial of due process and equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on equal footing before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on the account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold 
as follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny 
the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court arid one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
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Id. at 18 (citations omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional mandates of both due 
process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with a record 
which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review. At the same time, the 
Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary in instances where 
a less expensive, yet accurate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Court reaffirmed its holding in Griffin 
when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be 
accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of the defendant's indigency. The 
United States Supreme Court held that "once the State chooses to establish appellate 
review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that 
procedure because of their poverty." Id. at 257. "This principle is no less applicable 
where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its 
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of that 
procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining whether access to transcripts based on a frivolousness 
standard. "Under the present standard, .... [the appellants] must convince the trial 
judge that their contentions of error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript 
necessary to prosecute their appeal." Draper, 327 U.S. at 494. The Court first 
expanded upon its holding in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an 
equivalent alternative is available, by adding a relevancy requirement stating that "part 
or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration 
of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised on 
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appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it held "where the grounds of appeal ... make out a colorable need 
for a complete transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the 
transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds. Id at 
195. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardner v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
If the record establishes that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issues 
on appeal, due process and equal protection mandate that those transcripts be created 
at the public's expense, unless the State can prove that the requested transcripts are 
not relevant to the issues on appeal. 
C. The Requested Transcripts Are Relevant To Mr. Awantaye's Appeal Because He 
Is Challenging The Length Of His Sentence And The Applicable Standard Of 
Review Requires An Appellate Court To Independently Review The Entire 
Record Before The District Court 
The requested transcripts are necessary for review of the issue raised in this 
appeal because they are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of review. "In 
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examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent 
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing . . . . " State v. 
Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010); see also State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 
2009). In other words, an appellate court reviewing a district court's sentencing 
decision conducts an independent review of the entire record to determine if the record 
supports the district court's sentencing decisions. 
In this case, Judge Wetherell presided over the final disposition hearing held on 
March 13, 2013. (R., p.351.) Judge Wetherell also presided over the change of plea 
hearing held on May 10, 2005, the sentencing hearing held on July 14, 2005, the 
probation violation proceedings held on January 8, 2009, the probation violation hearing 
held on February 13, 2009, the rider review hearing held on July 24, 2009, the probation 
violation hearing held on August 6, 2010, and the probation violation hearing held on 
September 8, 2010. (R., pp.129, 133, 183, 185, 201, 234, 235.) Mr. Awantaye 
addressed the Court at the original sentencing hearing, the first probation violation 
disposition hearing, the first rider review hearing, and the second probation violation 
disposition hearing. {R., pp.133-134, 185-186, 201-202, 235-236.) The following 
authority establishes that the transcripts of those hearings will be necessary for an 
appellate court to review the merits of Mr. Awantaye appellate sentencing claims. 
The Idaho Supreme Court issued an opinion in State v. Brunet, 2013 Opinion 
No.108 (November 13, 2013) (petition for rehearing pending), which addressed the 
scope of review of an appeal filed from an order revoking probation, wherein the 
appellant argued that his sentence was excessively harsh. In that case, the Idaho 
Supreme Court determined that the defendant had not demonstrated a colorable need 
for the requested transcripts, and so, held there was no violation of the defendant's 
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rights by denying him copies of the transcripts. Brunet, 2013 Opinion No.108, pp.4-6. 
However, the Court did not change any of the pre-existing standards governing what 
transcripts are necessary for appellate review. See generally id. In fact, it reaffirmed 
the standard discussed in Pierce - that where the length of the sentence is at issue, the 
appellate court will conduct an independent review of the entire record available to the 
district court. Id. at 5. At best, the Brunet Opinion provides no guidance for determining 
whether requested transcripts are necessary to address merits of sentencing related 
issues. At worst, Brunet contravenes United States Supreme Court authority and the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 
153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), which attempted to address the scope of review of an 
appeal filed from an order revoking probation and clarify the circumstances under which 
transcripts of prior proceedings will be necessary for it to address the merits of Morgan's 
appellate claims. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on 
probation. Id. at 619. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating 
the terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation, but retained 
jurisdiction. Id. at 619-620. The defendant subsequently admitted to violating the terms 
of his probation and the district court revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed 
from the district court's second order revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and whether the district court abused 
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its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 620-21. The Idaho Court of Appeals held 
that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary for the appeal 
because "they were not before the district court in the second probation violation 
proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its revocation 
decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 621. The Court 
of Appeals then clarified the scope of review for a revocation determination. 
Specifically, it held: 
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Id. (original emphasis) (citation omitted). This case has provided no more guidance 
than Brunet because it also holds that all the information known to the district court is 
relevant, but failed to provide and explanation of the circumstances under which 
transcripts of the prior proceedings might be necessary to address sentencing issues on 
appeal. 
Additionally, the instant case is distinguishable because Morgan only addressed 
the order revoking probation, and here Mr. Awantaye is challenging the length of his 
sentence, which entails an analysis of "the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the 
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and 
the revocation of probation."2 Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Furthermore, whether the 
2 In Morgan, the Court of Appeals refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho 
Supreme Court denied him due process on the basis that it does not have the power to 
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transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district court at the time of the 
probation revocation hearing is not germane to the question of whether the transcripts 
are relevant to the issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a 
district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing 
from which the appeal was filed. Rather, the district court is entitled to utilize knowledge 
gained from its own official position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 
367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) 
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon 
what the court heard during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing 
that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that 
[the judge] has observed in the courts within its judicial district and the quantity of drugs 
overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. at 621. The Morgan Court went on 
to state that it would have the authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was 
filed with the Court of Appeals after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals 
and contained information or argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Id. However, this position is untenable because Idaho Appellate Rule 30 
requires that all motions to augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant 
portions of I.AR. 30 follow: 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that Mr. Morgan could 
have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is contrary to 
the Idaho Appellate Rules. Mr. Awantaye recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals 
has recently rejected virtually identical arguments in State v. Cornelison, 2013 
Published Opinion 22 (Ct. App. April 11, 2013). However, Mr. Awantaye disagrees with 
the holding in that case. 
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therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving 
sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a 
previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard 
what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior 
hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the 
information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the 
sentencing decision after revoking probation. 
The rationale behind this position comports with the Idaho Court of Appeals' 
reasoning in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053 (Ct. App. 1989), where the Court of 
Appeals explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire record when 
reviewing the executed sentence: 
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has 
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before 
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two 
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution 
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially 
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The 
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events 
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing 
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a 
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant 
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked, 
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an 
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the 
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on 
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a 
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a 
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see 
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the 
appellate system cluttered with such cases. 
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. 
As such, when an appellant files an appeal from a sentence ordered after the 
revocation of probation the applicable standard of review requires an independent and 
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comprehensive inquiry into the events which occurred prior to, as well as the events 
which occurred during, the probation revocation proceedings. The basis for this 
standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite properly remembers the 
entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision." Id. It 
follows that, "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate court] should consider the 
same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not hold that the district court must expressly 
reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition hearing in order for this scope 
of review to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals presumed the 
judge would automatically consider prejudgment events when determining what 
sentence should be executed after revoking probation. This is consistent with the Idaho 
Supreme Court precedent. See Sivak, 105 Idaho at 907. And, although the Brunet 
Court could have altered this standard it did not do as such. 
Since the requested transcripts are within the applicable standard of review, the 
Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Awantaye access to those transcripts 
constitutes a due process and equal protection violation. In Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 
477 (1963), a transcript was necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be 
dismissed without the transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an 
appellant must provide an adequate record or face procedural default. "It is well 
established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon 
which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, . . . . and where 
pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the 
actions of the trial court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); see also 
State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 
873 (Ct. App. 1985). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court 
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minutes which are sufficient to allow a meaningful review of an appellant's claim, then 
the transcripts are not necessary for review even though the Court of Appeals has 
"strongly suggest[edJ that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to 
provide ... [a] record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 
(Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Awantaye fails to provide the appellate court with transcripts 
necessary for review of his claim, the legal presumption will apply and Mr. Awantaye's 
sentencing claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action, 
combined with Mr. Awantaye's indigency, which prevents him from access to the 
necessary transcripts, then such action is a violation of the equal protection and due 
process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and any such presumption should no 
longer apply. 
Moreover, and in light of the denial of the transcripts, the foregoing presumption 
should be reversed in this case, and what occurred at those hearings should be 
presumed to discredit the district court's final sentencing decision. When Mr. Awantaye 
was first given the opportunity for probation, the district court must have found that the 
circumstances were right to give him an opportunity to be a member of society. To 
ignore the positive factors that were present at the previous hearings presents a 
negative, one-sided view of Mr. Awantaye. Denial of access to the requested 
transcripts has prevented Mr. Awantaye from addressing those positive factors in 
support of his appellate sentencing claims. In light of that denial, Mr. Awantaye argues 
that the events which occurred at the subject hearings should be presumed to invalidate 
the district court's final sentencing decisions in this matter. 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny an indigent defendant transcripts necessary 
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for a merits-based review on appeal. In this case, the requested transcripts are 
necessary to address the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review 
of an appellate sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent 
review of all of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review, 
the focus is not entirely on the district court's express sentencing rationale3; to the 
contrary, the question on appeal is whether the record itself supports the district court's 
ultimate sentencing decision. 
D. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Awantaye With Access To 
The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot 
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and held that the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants ·counsel on 
appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the Court recognized a due process 
right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. According to the United States 
Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
3 Both the United States Supreme Court and the Idaho Supreme Court have 
consistently held that due process requires trial courts to expressly articulate, on the 
record, their rationale for revoking probation in order to facilitate an effective merits 
based review of those decisions. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see also 
State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 152 (1986), supra. 
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examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Co~nsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
supports his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the 
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is 
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is factual support either in favor of any 
argument to be made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Awantaye has not 
obtained review of the court proceeding based on the merits and was not provided with 
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association's "Standards For Criminal 
Justice, The Defense Function." These standards offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . .. Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking substance. 
Standards 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
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presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
sentencing determination at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Awantaye 
on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Awantaye is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective counsel cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcripts. 
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Awantaye his constitutional rights 
to due process and equal protection which include a right to effective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access 
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any 
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments which arise as a result of 
that review. 
11. 
The District Court Abused· its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Awantaye's Probation 
Mr. Awantaye asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused 
its discretion when it revoked his probation. When a defendant appeals from an order 
revoking probation, the Idaho Court of Appeals has utilized the following framework: 
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence 
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation 
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the 
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation 
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct. App. 1987) . 
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Mr. Awantaye is not challenging the district district's finding that he violated the 
terms of his probation. Accordingly, he only contests the district court's decision to 
revoke his probation. "A district court's decision to revoke probation will not be 
overturned on appeal absent a showing that the court abused its discretion." State v. 
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Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "When a district court's discretionary decision is 
reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine 
whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within 
the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable 
to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason." 
State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003). "In deciding whether revocation 
of probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether the 
probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is 
consistent with the protection of society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 
2001). 
While Mr. Awantaye is not challenging the district court's conclusion that he 
violated the terms of his probation, his violations are not as egregious as they may 
initially appear. Mr. Awantaye was undergoing financial difficulties while on probation. 
(01/16/13 Tr., p.191, Ls.8-15.) Mr. Awantaye made the following statement about his 
financial situation while on probation: 
[My] financial situation was strapped. I support three children ... I have 
child support ... to my ex-wife. And then [we] went from a two-income 
household to a one-income household, things got harder. I had to 
purchase . . . a vehicle [to get to work]. Which eventually got repo'd 
because, again, I was going through ... major financial ... difficulties. 
(01/16/13 Tr., p.192, Ls.8-16.) The probation officer that last supervised Mr. Awantaye 
and filed the final report of probation violation, Officer Knightlinger, testified that 
Mr. Awantaye was employed from 2010 until his final arrest in 2012 and he was not 
aware of any reason why Mr. Awantaye could not pay his costs of supervision and his 
public defender fees. (01/16/13 Tr., p.59, Ls.11 - p. 60, L.18.) However, Officer 
Knightlinger did not know that Mr. Awantaye was supporting and paying child support 
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for four children. (01/16/13 Tr., p.75, L.75 - p.76, L.3; PSI, pp.78-79.) Even though 
Officer Knightlinger was so disengaged in his supervision of Mr. Awantaye4 he had no 
idea Mr. Awantaye was a father/step-father supporting four children, he had no problem 
characterizing Mr. Awantaye's alleged financial difficulties as mere "excuses." 
(01/16/13 Tr., p.79, Ls.3-12.) Moreover, Mr. Awantaye was caught up with his costs of 
supervision in June of 2013. (01/16/13 Tr., p.193, Ls.20-25.) Mr. Awantaye paid off his 
underlying restitution about seven years before the final probation violation disposition 
hearing. (01/16/13 Tr., p.194, Ls.6-15.) 
Additionally, Mr. Awantaye was never put on notice that he had to pay the public 
defender costs (01/16/13 Tr., p.194, L.9 - p.195, L.12) and he did not know if the public 
defender costs were associated with the original offense or if they were associated with 
the final probation violation. (01/16/13 Tr., p.195, Ls.10-13.) In fact, Officer Knightlinger 
could not testify whether he notified him that he owed public defender costs. (01/16/13 
Tr., p.84, L.10 - p.85, L.15.) The Ada County restitution coordinator, the person 
responsible of putting Mr. Awantaye on notice that he had a public defender fees stated 
that she sent Mr. Awantaye a letter in November of 2012 about the public defender fees 
but could not affirmatively testify that Mr. Awantaye actually received notice that he 
owed public defender costs. (01/16/13 Tr., p.123, L.21 - p.126, L.16.) 
Mr. Awantaye also testified on cross examination that his previous probation 
officers did not require him to get permission to occasionally house sit at his ex-wife's 
parents' cabin in McCall, Idaho. (01/16/13 Tr., p.213, Ls.6-13.) 
4 Mr. Awantaye testified that he maintained continual contact with Mr. Knightlinger via 
email letting him know about his changing financial situations and living locations and 
that Mr. Awantaye would communicate any changes even when he was not required to 
under the terms of his probation agreement. (01/16/13 Tr., p.191, Ls.3-15.) 
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Mr. Awantaye does not pose a significant threat to society. According to 
Mr. Awantaye's trial counsel: 
He is a very intelligent young man. Very capable. 
He has always maintained until recently a good and stable residence and 
a family life. He supports multiple children. He has always been able to 
maintain good and steady employment. Worked for HP for many years as 
a contractor for them. And you know the support system that he has. 
People care deeply and are willing to say good things about him. And you 
of course presided over the hearing where some people actually testified 
on his behalf. They care enough for him to do that. 
(03/12/13 Tr., p.10, L.14 - p.11, L.2.) Mr. Awantaye did go through a significant life 
change as his sister died during the most recent period of probation. (01/16/13 
Tr., p.191, Ls.8-11.) 
In sum, Mr. Awantaye's probation was not perfect, but there are mitigating 
explanations for some of his probation violations. When the goals of rehabilitation and 
protection of society are viewed in light of those mitigating explanations, they support 
the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Reduce Mr. Awantaye's 
Sentences Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation 
Mr. Awantaye asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
five years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Due to the district court's power under 
I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence sua sponte upon the revocation 
of probation, on appeal an appellant can challenge the length of the sentence as being 
excessive. State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003). Where a defendant 
contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the 
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appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public 
interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Awantaye does not allege 
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an 
abuse of discretion, Mr. Awantaye must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, 
or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
There are mitigating factors which support the conclusion that Mr. Awantaye's 
sentence is excessively harsh. Specifically, Mr. Awantaye's education and employment 
background are mitigating factors. Mr. Awantaye completed high school and attended 
college for a year and one-half. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), 
pp.56, 58.) Mr. Awantaye's primary language is Italian, and English is his second 
language. (PSI, p.58.) At the time Mr. Awantaye committed the underlying offense, he 
was employed at Citi Group and was considered by his employer to be "a fantastic 
employee who does an outstanding job .... " (PSI, p.59.) Mr. Awantaye's work ethic is 
also evinced by the fact he performed well while on both of his riders and received 
probation recommendations. (PSI, pp.109-113, 184-191.) 
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Mr. Awantaye's support system is a mitigating factor. Prior to the original 
sentencing hearing, Mr. Awantaye received support letters from his wife and his in-laws 
indicating that he is a loving father and a responsible employee. (PSI, pp.64-65.) 
Mr. Awantaye also received a letter from Boise Psychological Services which concluded 
that he exhibited positive parenting capabilities. (PSI, p.86.) Mr. Awantaye also 
received a letter from a friend, Steven Johnson, stating that Mr. Awantaye supported 
Mr. Johnson through periods of severe depression. (PSI, p.177.) 
In sum, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to reduce his 
sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Awantaye respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues or arguments 
which arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Awantaye 
requests that this case be remanded with instructions to place him on probation. 
Alternatively, Mr. Awantaye respectfully request that this court reduce the fixed portion 
of his sentence be reduced. Alternatively, Mr. Awantaye respectfully requests that this 
Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 1 ih day of December, 2013. 
/~~1'-- j/-~-=~-·· 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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